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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
By ELI M. SPARK*
The cases in this field during the period covered were both more numerous and more varied than in the preceding corresponding period.
REAL PROPERTY SECURITY

Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co. v. Fogel' held that where there was an
acceleration clause in a security deed and a note, the two papers referring
to each other, and the acceleration clause providing that any "deficiency"
in the payment of any monthly installment should constitute a default if
not paid prior to the due date of the next installment, the one-month grace
period so provided was available to the grantor whether the "deficiency"
was caused by nonpayment of an entire installment or of only a part of an
installment. The grantor was awarded a temporary restraining order and
injunction to prevent the grantee from exercising the power of sale in the
deed.
Defendant, in Parkerv. Cherokee Building Supply Co.,' in another action
had sued to foreclose a laborer's lien against his son in violation of an
agreement with Cherokee, supplier of materials for the son's home, and he
obtained judgment. Before sale of the property under the judgment, Cherokee sued to enjoin the sale and to set aside defendant's judgment, but the
court, with the consent of the parties here, directed the sale to be made, the
proceeds to stand in lieu of the property to satisfy the respective lien
claims, which, were then still sub judice. Cherokee purchased at the sale.
The Supreme Court held valid the sale of the property as directed by the
court below although the foreclosure judgment was later set aside, but the
rights of the lien holders could thereafter be asserted only against the
proceeds from the sale.3 A second foreclosure judgment which defendant
later obtained was therefore properly set aside as a cloud on Cherokee's
title.
West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck' involved both the law of sales and security
law. Plaintiff sought to recover the value of construction materials, approximating $8,8oo, sold to the defendant, who had earlier given to another
a note and loan deed of the same property to secure a construction loan of
$io,ooo. Plaintiff had acquired the note and loan deed by transfer, and in
a foreclosure sale purchased the property at $12,0oo, later reselling the
same for $26,500. Cross-action by defendant alleged that the sale of the
materials was on open account,, that plaintiff had agreed to give defendant
a reasonable time to sell the property before demanding payment therefor,
that the property was worth S30,0o0

to $35,oo0,

and that plaintiff's pur-

*Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; A.B., 1926,
College of the City of New York; LL.B., 1929, Fordham University; Member New
York, Georgia and U. S. Supreme Court Bars, Georgia and American Bar Asso-

ciations.
1. 207 Ga. 602, 63 S.E.2d 382 (1951).
2. 207 Ga. 710, 64 S.E.2d 51 (1951).
3. The opinion cited GA. CODE §§ 67-2301 (3), 110-501 (1933).
4. 82 Ga. App. 799, 62 S.E.2d 370 (1950).
(163)
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chase of the security deed and foreclosure thereunder constituted a breach
of contract and an estoppel to deny payment in full. Judgment for defendant was reversed and new trial granted because of insufficient evidence
of defenses to submit to the jury and erroneous charges by.the court. The
Court of Appeals held proper, however, the charge that if the jury found
an agreement made respecting time of payment for the materials, as contended by defendant, the sale was one on credit, and plaintiff's failure to
observe the terms would constitute a breach entitling to recovery on the
cross-action.
Several points of security deed law were developed in a land registration
proceeding.' It was there held that claim of title by the applicant under a
deed executed June I, 1938, could not prevail as against a claim by-the
defendants under a chain of title beginning with foreclosure under a security
deed with power of sale executed by the same grantor and dated March
27, 1920, where the grantor, if he paid the indebtedness (as alleged by the
applicant), failed to secure cancellation of the security deed and satisfaction of record, the defendants being purchasers for value and without
notice. Ruled out as evidence of payment and satisfaction of the security
deed because not complying with Code Section 67-13o6, was the following
notation on the security deed : "Sept. 12/2 7, the note this deed secures having been paid but having been misplaced. It is not held by anyone else.
[Signed] A. T. Small." The applicant here, the court held, could not object
that the foreclosure sale was void or voidable because foreclosure was had
only against one of the two tracts of land covered by the security deed
(the omitted tract in the foreclosure sale had a prior lien thereon). The
right to disaffirm such sale was personal to the grantor, and to be exercised
within a reasonable time; even as to him it could not be availed of in the
"absence of any allegation or proof that the . . . tract was worth in excess
of the amount of the prior lien . . . "'
Williams v. O'Connor' was a common law ejectment suit brought by
the heirs of the grantee in a prior security deed, against the purchasers at a
foreclosure sale under a later security deed. The debt secured by plaintiffs'
deed was over twenty years past due. The Supreme Court ruled that, as
the statute8 provides that in such case title reverts to the grantor, plaintiffs'
deed should have been excluded from evidence.
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY

In East Atlanta Bank v. Nicholson9 defendant had left certain autos
with a used car dealer to sell and divide the profits. Instead of selling them,
the dealer executed a bill of sale to plaintiff bank to secure loans made
against them. The bank relied wholly on the dealer's word that he owned
the cars, and defendant did nothing to mislead the bank into lending on
them. On these facts, in a trover action by the bank against defendant, it
was held that defendant was not estopped from asserting his title as against
5. Burgess v. Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 61 S.E.2d 410 (1950).
6. Reference is made by the court to GA. COD §§ 67-1305 and 67-2501 (1933) in the
opinion.
7.

208 Ga. 39, 64 S.E.2d 890 (1951).

9.

83 Ga. App. 557, 63 S.E.2d 699 (1951).

8. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1308, 67-1315 (Supp. 1947).

19511

SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

the bank, under Ga. Code Section 37-113 (which provides that when one
of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who put it in
the power of the third person to inflict the injury shall bear the loss), nor
divested of his title by virtue of Ga. Code Section 96-207 (which provides
that when an owner gives another "such evidence of the right of selling
his goods as, according to the custom of the trade or the common underof the world, usually accompanies the authority of disposal," or
4standing
'the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property," an innocent
purchaser acquires the true owner's title). The jury's verdict for the defendant was thus held to be authorized, and the new trial motion held
properly overruled.
In Rose City Foods v. Bank of Thomas County, 1 two security bills of
sale upon four motor vehicles, held by the defendant bank, contained a
"dragnet" clause which purported to secure the bank for "any and all
other indebtedness now due . . . or hereafter incurred by me directly or
indirectly . . ." Plaintiff, who was another creditor of the bank's debtor,

purchased the motor vehicles subject to the security bills of sale held by the
bank at a time when the bank's claim had been reduced to only $1,148.33.
The bank, which had notice of plaintiff's purchase, subsequently acquired
by transfer (as a payment on an antecedent debt) from a third party creditor of the same debtor an additional claim in the amount of $1,681,28.
It was held that plaintiff was not entitled to have the two bills of sale cancelled of record until the bank received payment in full of the subsequently
acquired claim as well as of the earlier balance of $1,148.33.
In Pethel v. General Finance Thrift Corp." suit was brought to recover
a balance due on promissory notes secured by bills of sale to autos. The
security vendee had sold some of the cars and entered credits against the
loans on its ledger. It had also entered on its ledger, on dates other than.
received, amounts paid by the security vendor in checks which were later
dishonored. Different balances were due, as figured from the amounts
received from the sale of the autos and from the security vendee's evidence.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the vendee had failed to sustain the burden
of showing in detail what the credits were. The sale by the vendee, under
the security bills of sale, was as agent or attorney in fact for the security
vendor; since as such he owed the vendor good faith and due diligence, he
would have to show manner of sale, to whom sold, and selling price of each
car before a deficiency judgment would be given against the vendor.
In a statutory foreclosure proceeding of a retention title contract, "
plaintiffs were held not entitled to collect attorney's fees, for noncompliance with the statutory provisions 3 making obligations to pay attorney's
fees in addition to interest void, unless the holder gives ten days notice
in writing of intention to sue and the debtor fails to pay the debt on or
before the return day of the suit.
Bell v. Tyson 4 had to do with the right to file a second affidavit of illegality in a statutory foreclosure of a security bill of sale. Although the first
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

207 Ga. 477, 62 S.E.2d 145 (1950).
83 Ga. App. 562, 63 S.E.2d 907 (1951).
Dupree v. Blankenship, 83 Ga. App. 664, 64 S.E.2d 457 (1951).
GA. CODE ANN. § 20-506 (Supp. 1947).
83 Ga. App. 743, 64 S.E.2d 693 (1951).
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affidavit was withdrawn or dismissed without trial, said the Court of Appeals, a second affidavit alleging that the facts stated therein were not
known, and by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have beerr
known, when the first affidavit was filed, was insufficient to entitle defendant
to have it considered, when the facts so alleged in the second affidavit, and
their nature and circumstances, indicated that they existed and must have
been known to defendant when the first affidavit was filed. The rule as to
a second affidavit is found in Rule 48 of the Rules of the Superior Court
(Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3348).
MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

In Cheshire v. Engelhart" the Court of Appeals ruled that one engaged
by a general building contractor to do electrical work could not claim and
foreclose a lien, in a suit against the building owner, for a balance due
for labor and material furnished by him to the general contractor, without
previously or concurrently suing the contractor for such balance. As the:
court stated, " quoting from a Supreme Court case:
The reason of the rule is that the landowner should not be called on to pay
a debt he did not contract, and for which his property is liable only by force

of a statute, until the materialman has established by judgment, in a proceed-

ing to which the contractor is a party, that the contractor owes to him the
amount for which he is seeking to assert his lien. Pike Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Mitchell ,132 Ga. 675, 676, 64 S.E. 998, 26 L.R.A. (N.s.) 409 (1909).

In Langford v. Edmondson," however, it was held that where a prime
contractor was adjudicated bankrupt during the time a subcontracting
materialman was performing his contract, the materialman need not bring
suit against the prime contractor before perfecting his lien against the
property. 8 The court ruled also that the owner of the realty could defend
against foreclosure of such lien by showing that he had paid the full contract price, and that the prime contractor had in turn applied the proceeds
to accounts which would or might have become liens on the property; but
he must produce factual evidence thereof, and mere conclusions will not
suffice.
MISCELLANEOUS LIENS

United Bonded Warehouse, Inc. v. Jackson" was a suit based upon unpaid salary due to a secretary-stenographer, i.e., a clerical employee. Such
employee was ruled not to be entitled to a general laborer's lien or to a
special laborer's lien, under the respective statutes, ° since no manual labor
was involved. Where such employee, as plaintiff, alleged that if a warehouseman was permitted to complete its public sale of the employer-defendant's goods, on which it had a storage lien, said property would not
bring as much as could be obtained by a private sale, the trial court was
held to have erred in appointing a receiver of the employer-defendant and
an auditor, and in enjoining the sale, in the absence of any claim against the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

82 Ga. App. 458, 61 S.E.2d 434 (1950).
Id. at 458-459, 61 S.E.2d at 435.
82 Ga. App. 494, 61 S.E.2d 558 (1950).
Citing GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2002 (3) (Supp. 1947).
207 Ga. 627, 63 S.E.2d 666 (1951).
GA. CODE §§ 67-1801, 67-1802 (1933).

1951]

SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

warehouseman or any charge of misconduct or fault. That error, said the
Supreme Court, rendered all subsequent proceedings nugatory, so that
failure to except to the auditor's report did not render it binding, and the
warehouseman did not, upon a reversal, have to pay any share of the expenses and costs of the proceeding. Before an unsecured creditor can obtain
an injunction, receivership or other equitable relief, it must appear clearly
that there is a present manifest wrong or injury imminently impending.
The respective rights of landlord, cropper, and crop lienor were involved
in another case. 1 While the title to crops, as between landlord and cropper,
remains in the landlord until payment of all advances from him to the cropper and the division of the crop, a third party, who made advances to the
cropper at the landlord's request and on the landlord's waiver of all liens
against the crops in favor of such third party's lien, was held to have a lien
thereon superior to the landlord's interest, under Ga. Code Section 61-;o2.
After payment to the landlord for all advances by him, the cropper has title
to his share of the crop, and thus has a mortgageable interest in crops grown
by him despite his landlord's title thereto. The landlord cannot make claims
against the crops for indebtedness for previous years, that will defeat a
third party's lien for advances to the cropper. A special agreement may
vary the landlord's statutory rights as to the crops. The landlord here
having expressly waived his liens on the crops to induce the Credit Association to give the cropper advances necessary to make the crops, his later appropriation to his own use of the proceeds of their' sale (which were sufficient to satisfy the Credit Association's lien for such advances), will result
in his being declared a trustee ex maleficio for the Credit Association, under
Ga. Code Section 108-107, and the Credit Association thus entitled to
recover the full amount which it has advanced on the tenant's note and
security bill of sale of the crops.
SURETYSIIP

The distinction between suretyship and guaranty was at the root of the
decision in Erbelding v. Noland Co. 2 2 After goods had been sold and

delivered to a corporation on open account which became past due, an
officer and stockholder executed a contract guaranteeing payment of the
account in consideration of an extension of time for payment, and waiving
notice of nonpayment and of failure to collect the account. Such individual
was held to have been made thereby only secondarily and collaterally liable,
the contract being properly construed as one of guaranty and not suretyship; hence before action could be maintained on the contract, it had to
appear that the corporate principal debtor was insolvent, or unable to
respond to any judgment against it. The lower court had overruled a
demurrer to the petition based on the omission of such allegations; the
Court of Appeals reversed. It quoted the faulty doctrine of Ga. Code
Section 103-101, which purports to distinguish between suretyship and
21. Trapnell v. Swainsboro Production Credit Assn., 208 Ga. 89, 65 S.E.2d 179 (1951).
22. 83 Ga. App. 464, 64 S.E.2d 218 (1951).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

guaranty, but stated that that was only one of the distinctions,
and re3
viewed other distinctions made by leading Georgia cases.1
The by-products of the W. T. Rawleigh Co. business seem to include a
certain proportion of the Georgia cases on points of suretyship and guaranty law. One hardy perennial, which has gone through four trials, was
passed on by the Court of Appeals for the third time. 4 The Pain v. Packard2" doctrine was involved, as codified by Ga. Code Section 103-205.
Williams, as principal, had bought goods from Rawleigh under successive
contracts. One ran to December 31, 1930, the second to January 31, 1932.

Overstreet, Davis and Cato, the defendants in this action, were sureties
on the first contract; the same Cato and one Forbes were sureties on the
second. By a provision in the second contract, the sureties thereunder were
liable for "all goods . . . previously sold . . . under and by virtue of any

and all prior contracts or agreements" to Williams. The sureties on the
first contract gave written notice to the creditor to sue Williams, a resident
of Chatham County. When later sued under the first contract, the sureties
contended that they had been discharged under said statutory provision
because no suit had been brought against Williams pursuant to the notice.
Rawleigh contended that its commencement of a suit against Williams as
principal and Cato and Forbes as sureties in Chatham County on the second
contract was a compliance with the notice from the present defendants;
furthermore, that the deputy's return in that action said that Williams
could not be found in his bailiwick, and the present defendants, not having
traversed it, were bound by such return. The trial court ruled otherwise,
and gave judgment for the defendants, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The suit on the second contract "was not on the obligation now involved,"
said the appellate court; also, since the present defendants were not parties
to that suit, they were not bound to traverse the officer's entry of nonservice
to avoid becoming bound thereby. Another suit which Rawleigh attempted
to bring against Williams and the present defendants on the first contract,
alleging that Williams was a resident of Richmond County, but which was
not pursued against Williams (who was never served, not being in fact in
that county) was likewise held no compliance by the creditor with the
statute's requirement. Said the court:
. . . Such a holding would be manifestly unfair to a surety. He is entitled
under the law to have the creditor sue the principal debtor, if he can be found.
See MeCarter v. Turner, 49 Ga. 309, 312. Such was 26
the purpose of the General

Assembly in the enactment of the above Code section.

And further:
• . . There was no suit in the county of the principal debtor's residence, to
which these sureties were parties, where the sheriff made an entry that the
Principal debtor was not to be found therein. Watkins Co. v. Seawright, 40
Ga. App. 314, 149 S.E. 389. In such a case there
27 would have been no necessity
for the filing of a suit in response to the notice.
23. Manry v. Waxelbaum, 108 Ga. 14, 33 S.E. 701 (1899) ; Etheridge v. W. T. Raleigh
Co., 29 Ga: App. 698, 702, 116 S.E. 903, 905 (1923) ; Heard v. Tappan & Merritt,
116 Ga. 930 (1), 43 S.E. 375 (1903); Musgrove v. D. E. Luther Publishing Co.,
5 Ga. App. 279,281, 63 S.E. 52, 53 (1908).
24. W. T. Raleigh Co. v. Overstreet, 84 Ga. App. 21, 65 S.E.2d 50 (1951).
25. 13 Johns. 174 (N.Y. 1816).
26. 84 Ga. App. at 26, 65 S.E.2d at 54.
27. 84 Ga. App. at 25, 65 S.E.2d at 53.
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SURETY BONDS

In the 1949-I95O Annual Survey of Georgia Law 8 there were reviewed

the Court of Appeals decisions in Southeastern Const. Co. for use of Gill
Equip. Co. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co.2" and Southeastern Const. Co. for
use of Beckham v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co." The Supreme Court thereafter reviewed on certiorari and reversed in a 4-3 decision, these two and
a third related case. 3" It ruled that the surety company's completion bond
covering the contract between the prime contractor and a subcontractor,
which indemnified the prime contractor for the performance and fulfillment
of the subcontractor's agreement to furnish, provide and pay for all labor
and material, created no privity between the surety and materialmen who
furnished such subcontractor with labor and materials; it was therefore
not a bond under which such materialmen could sue the surety. It cited
Ga. Code Section 103-103 and several earlier Supreme Court decisions 2
as determinative. The Court of Appeals accordingly, in three separate decisions,33 then vacated its judgments which had reversed the trial court, and
instead affirmed the trial court's judgments.
WJ'hite v. Trippe34 involved a building wrecking contract which provided
that the wrecker as principal and another as "security, hereby agree to make
bond" in $i,ooo payable to the owner "in the event that he suffers damages
for the failure of the (wrecker) . . . to comply with the provisions herein,

or failure to complete by date agreed on." The surety paid the owner the
$i,ooo on the wrecker's breach, and took an assignment of the owner's
claim. As assignee, he sued the wrecker to recover the amount paid. The
contract provisions were ambiguous, the court ruled, so that whether they
were intended themselves to be the bond or suretyship contract or merely
an agreement to-execute another instrument as a bond was a jury question.
Furthermore, plaintiff's petition did not state a cause of action against the
principal unless it showed that the owner had been damaged by the breach.
Whether a bond was a sealed instrument, for the purpose of determining
the applicable statute of limitations, was the problem in Chastain v. L.
Moss Music Co."3 A forthcoming bond given in 1939 contained a recital
at the bottom that it was signed and sealed. The principal signed on the
right-hand side under this recital, with the word "Seal" after her name; on
the left-hand side, where an officer approving the bond should have signed,
the surety signed his name followed by the letters "L.C." There was apparently a place on the right-hand side, below the principal's signature, for
the surety's signature, with the word "Seal" alongside and the word
28. 2 MERCERL. REv. 213-214 (1950).
29. 81 Ga. App. 764, 59 S.E.2d 747 (1950).
30. 81 Ga. App. 770, 59 S.E.2d 751 (1.950).
31. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v, Southeastern Construction Co. for use of Gill Equipment Co., 207 Ga. 488, 62 S.E.2d 149 (1950).
32. American Surety Co. v. Small Quarries Co., 157 Ga. 33, 120 S.E. 617 (1923), and
American Surety Co. v. County of Bibb, 162 Ga. 388, 134 S.E. 100 (1926).
33. Southeastern Const. Co. for use of Beckham v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 82
Ga. App. 753, 62 S.E.2d 396 (1950) ; Southeastern Const. Co. for use of Gill Equip.
Co. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 82 Ga. App. 752, 62 S.E.2d 397 (1950); Southeastern Const. Co. for use of D-A Lubricant Co. v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 82
Ga. App. 752, 62 S.E.2d 397 (1950).
34. 83 Ga. App. 412, 63 S.E.2d 710 (1951).
35. 83 Ga. App. 570, 64 S.E.2d 205 (1951).
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"Security" beneath it. The full Court of Appeals ruled that the bond was
not a sealed instrument as to the surety, since no seal or scroll was placed
after or affixed to his signature, and therefore, the suit begun against the
surety in 1948 was barred. Georgia Code Sections 3-703 and ib2-Io3 were

cited. One judge dissented, stating that in the absence of evidence of a
contrary intention by the surety, the "Seal" in the proper right-hand place
provided for the surety's signature should be treated as applying to the
signature actually made on the left-hand side.
Two cases involved unsuccessful attempts to establish liability under
0 the
police officials' bonds. In New vimsterdam Casualty Co. v. Mathis,"
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in overruling a general
demurrer to a petition seeking to hold a surety on a police officer's official
bond liable for collision damages resulting from his negligent operation of
a car owned by a county police department. The fact that he was on an
official mission did not convert such act into the performance of an official
duty by virtue of or under color of his office, within the scope of his official
bond, and was not a breach of his bond to discharge the duties of his office
faithfully, even if he committed a tort by driving negligently and violating
traffic regulations. The court ruled that Culpepper v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co."7 was controlling; one judge expressed his concurrence as being for the sole reason that the Culpepper case was controlling.
In Walker v. Whittle," the Court of Appeals ruled that the act of a sheriff
in requesting the sheriff of another county to arrest a named person did
not give rise to a cause of action against the sheriff- making such request
or the surety on his official bond for a breach of the bond, predicated on an

alleged invasion of the right of privacy of the arrested person's wife. This
was so though no warrant for such arrest had been issued at the time of
the request or of the arrest; still, said the court, the sheriff did not counsel
any wrongful act, and could not reasonably foresee that an illegal arrest
would in fact be made. The court cited Ga. Code Sections 24-28o5, 26-1502,
27-2o9 and 89-418, and Ga. Constitution, Article i, Section i, Paragraph
I6.
NEW STATUTES

Act No. 539 amends Ga. Code Section 29-407 so that whenever a deed,
mortgage, bond for title or other registrable instrument appears by its
caption only to be executed in one state or county, and the official attesting
witness appears to be an officer of a different state or of another county,
not having jurisdiction to witness such instruments in the state or county
named in the caption, the instrument shall be conclusively considered and
construed to have been attested by the officer in the state or county where
he had authority to act, the caption to the contrary notwithstanding. The
amendment adds the provisions as to another "State," the section having
previously referred to different counties only.
36.
37.
38.
39.

82 Ga. App. 421, 61 S.E.2d 422 (1950).
199 Ga. 56, 33 S.E.2d 168 (1945).
83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951).
Ga. Laws 1951, p. 29.

1951]

SECURITY

TRANSACTIONS

Act No. 30840 amends Ga. Code Section I13-17o6, relating to a petition
and order by the ordinary to sell land of a decedent when necessary for the
payment of debts of the estate or for purposes of distribution. It adds two
sentences, one of which is a proviso that: ". . . nothing in this section shall
prevent a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of said land who purchased
prior to said order of the ordinary and who holds under a deed or mortgage duly recorded prior to said order, from asserting his title to said land
by showing that the executor had assented expressly or impliedly to the
devise in said will prior to said order to sell."
Act No. 3o1"1 provides that in counties having a population of not less
than 29,7oo and not more than 29,75o according to the i95o United States
census or any future United States census, the clerk of the superior court
may provide separate index books for recording real property and personal
property instruments, and when so provided, a duplex index book shall be
used for real property instruments and a single index book, known as a
direct index, for personal property instruments. This act amends Code
Section 24-27I5 (8).
40. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 476.
41. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 468.

